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Abstract
Artificial general intelligence aims to create agents capable of learning to
solve arbitrary interesting problems. We define two versions of asymptotic
optimality and prove that no agent can satisfy the strong version while in
some cases, depending on discounting, there does exist a non-computable
weak asymptotically optimal agent.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Notation and Definitions 3
3 Non-Existence of Asymptotically Optimal Policies 6
4 Existence of Weak Asymptotically Optimal Policies 10
5 Discussion 15
A Technical Proofs 19
B Table of Notation 21
Keywords
Rational agents; sequential decision theory; artificial general intelligence; re-
inforcement learning; asymptotic optimality; general discounting.
1
1 Introduction
The dream of artificial general intelligence is to create an agent that, starting with
no knowledge of its environment, eventually learns to behave optimally. This means
it should be able to learn chess just by playing, or Go, or how to drive a car or mow
the lawn, or any task we could conceivably be interested in assigning it.
Before considering the existence of universally intelligent agents, we must be
precise about what is meant by optimality. If the environment and goal are known,
then subject to computation issues, the optimal policy is easy to construct using
an expectimax search from sequential decision theory [NR03]. However, if the true
environment is unknown then the agent will necessarily spend some time exploring,
and so cannot immediately play according to the optimal policy. Given a class of
environments, we suggest two definitions of asymptotic optimality for an agent.
1. An agent is strongly asymptotically optimal if for every environment in the
class it plays optimally in the limit.
2. It is weakly asymptotic optimal if for every environment in the class it plays
optimally on average in the limit.
The key difference is that a strong asymptotically optimal agent must eventually
stop exploring, while a weak asymptotically optimal agent may explore forever, but
with decreasing frequency.
In this paper we consider the (non-)existence of weak/strong asymptotically opti-
mal agents in the class of all deterministic computable environments. The restriction
to deterministic is for the sake of simplicity and because the results for this case
are already sufficiently non-trivial to be interesting. The restriction to computable
is more philosophical. The Church-Turing thesis is the unprovable hypothesis that
anything that can intuitively be computed can also be computed by a Turing ma-
chine. Applying this to physics leads to the strong Church-Turing thesis that the
universe is computable (possibly stochastically computable, i.e. computable when
given access to an oracle of random noise). Having made these assumptions, the
largest interesting class then becomes the class of computable (possibly stochastic)
environments.
In [Hut04], Hutter conjectured that his universal Bayesian agent, AIXI, was
weakly asymptotically optimal in the class of all computable stochastic environ-
ments. Unfortunately this was recently shown to be false in [Ors10], where it
is proven that no Bayesian agent (with a static prior) can be weakly asymptoti-
cally optimal in this class.1 The key idea behind Orseau’s proof was to show that
AIXI eventually stops exploring. This is somewhat surprising because it is nor-
mally assumed that Bayesian agents solve the exploration/exploitation dilemma in
a principled way. This result is a bit reminiscent of Bayesian (passive induction)
1Or even the class of computable deterministic environments.
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inconsistency results [DF86a, DF86b], although the details of the failure are very
different.
We extend the work of [Ors10], where only Bayesian agents are considered, to
show that non-computable weak asymptotically optimal agents do exist in the class
of deterministic computable environments for some discount functions (including
geometric), but not for others. We also show that no asymptotically optimal agent
can be computable, and that for all “reasonable” discount functions there does not
exist a strong asymptotically optimal agent.
The weak asymptotically optimal agent we construct is similar to AIXI, but
with an exploration component similar to ǫ-learning for finite state Markov decision
processes or the UCB algorithm for bandits. The key is to explore sufficiently
often and deeply to ensure that the environment used for the model is an adequate
approximation of the true environment. At the same time, the agent must explore
infrequently enough that it actually exploits its knowledge. Whether or not it is
possible to get this balance right depends, somewhat surprisingly, on how forward
looking the agent is (determined by the discount function). That it is sometimes not
possible to explore enough to learn the true environment without damaging even a
weak form of asymptotic optimality is surprising and unexpected.
Note that the exploration/exploitation problem is well-understood in the Ban-
dit case [ACBF02, BF85] and for (finite-state stationary) Markov decision processes
[SL08]. In these restrictive settings, various satisfactory optimality criteria are avail-
able. In this work, we do not make any assumptions like Markov, stationary, er-
godicity, or else besides computability of the environment. So far, no satisfactory
optimality definition is available for this general case.
2 Notation and Definitions
We use similar notation to [Hut04, Ors10] where the agent takes actions and the
environment returns an observation/reward pair.
Strings. A finite string a over alphabet A is a finite sequence a1a2a3 · · · an−1an
with ai ∈ A. An infinite string ω over alphabet A is an infinite sequence ω1ω2ω3 · · · .
An, A∗ and A∞ are the sets of strings of length n, strings of finite length, and
infinite strings respectively. Let x be a string (finite or infinite) then substrings
are denoted xs:t := xsxs+1 · · ·xt−1xt where s, t ∈ N and s ≤ t. Strings may be
concatenated. Let x, y ∈ A∗ of length n and m respectively, and ω ∈ A∞. Then
define xy := x1x2 · · ·xn−1xny1y2 · · · ym−1ym and xω := x1x2 · · ·xn−1xnω1ω2ω3 · · · .
Some useful shorthands,
x<t := x1:t−1 yx<t := y1x1y2x2 · · · yt−1xt−1. (1)
The second of these is ambiguous with concatenation, so wherever yx<t appears
we assume the interleaving definition of (1) is intended. For example, it will be
common to see yx<tyt, which represents the string y1x1y2x2y3x3 · · · yt−1xt−1yt. For
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binary strings, we write #1(a) and #0(a) to mean the number of 0’s and number
of 1’s in a respectively.
o1|r1
y1
o2|r2
y2
o3|r3
y3
o4|r4
y4
o5|r5
y5 · · ·
· · ·
agent, π environment, µ
Environments and Optimality. Let Y , O and
R ⊂ R be action, observation and reward spaces
respectively. Let X = O × R. An agent interacts
with an environment as illustrated in the diagram
on the right. First, the agent takes an action, upon
which it receives a new observation/reward pair.
The agent then takes another action, receives another observation/reward pair, and
so-on indefinitely. The goal of the agent is to maximise its discounted rewards
over time. In this paper we consider only deterministic environments where the
next observation/reward pair is determined by a function of the previous actions,
observations and rewards.
Definition 1 (Deterministic Environment). A deterministic environment µ is a
function µ : (Y ×X )∗×Y → X where µ(yx<tyt) ∈ X is the observation/reward pair
given after action yt is taken in history yx<t. Wherever we write xt we implicitly
assume xt = (ot, rt) and refer to ot and rt without defining them. An environment
µ is computable if there exists a Turing machine that computes it.
Note that since environments are deterministic the next observation need not
depend on the previous observations (only actions). We choose to leave the depen-
dence as the proofs become clearer when both the action and observation sequence
is more visible.
Assumption 2. Y and O are finite, R = [0, 1].
Definition 3 (Policy). A policy π is a function from a history to an action π :
(Y × X )∗ → Y .
As expected, a policy π and environment µ can interact with each other to
generate a play-out sequence of action/reward/observation tuples.
Definition 4 (Play-out Sequence). We define the play-out sequence yxµ,π ∈ (Y ×
X )∞ inductively by yµ,πk := π(yx
µ,π
<k ) and x
µ,π
k := µ(yx
µ,π
<k y
µ,π
k ).
We need to define the value of a policy π in environment µ. To avoid the
possibility of infinite rewards, we will use discounted values. While it is common
to use only geometric discounting, we have two reasons to allow arbitrary time-
consistent discount functions.
1. Geometric discounting has a constant effective horizon, but we feel agents
should be allowed to use a discount function that leads to a growing horizon.
This is seen in other agents, such as humans, who generally become less myopic
as they grow older. See [FOO02] for a overview of generic discounting.
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2. The existence of asymptotically optimal agents depends critically on the ef-
fective horizon of the discount function.
Definition 5 (Discount Function). A regular discount function γ ∈ R∞ is a vector
satisfying γk ≥ 0 and 0 <
∑
∞
t=k γt <∞ for all k ∈ N.
The first condition is natural for any definition of a discount function. The
second condition is often cited as the purpose of a discount function (to prevent
infinite utilities), but economists sometimes use non-summable discount functions,
such as hyperbolic. The second condition also guarantees the agent cares about the
infinite future, and is required to make asymptotic analysis interesting. We only
consider discount functions satisfying all three conditions. In the following, let
Γt :=
∞∑
i=t
γi Ht(p) := min
h∈N
{
h :
1
Γt
t+h∑
k=t
γk > p
}
.
An infinite sequence of rewards starting at time t, rt, rt+1, rt+2, · · · is given a value of
1
Γt
∑
∞
i=t γiri. The term
1
Γt
is a normalisation term to ensure that values scale in such
a way that they can still be compared in the limit. A discount function is computable
if there exists a Turing machine computing it. All well known discount functions,
such as geometric, fixed horizon and hyperbolic are computable. Note that Ht(p)
exists for all p ∈ [0, 1) and represents the effective horizon of the agent. After Ht(p)
time-steps into the future, starting at time t, the agent stands to gain/lose at most
1− p.
Definition 6 (Values and Optimal Policy). The value of policy π when starting from
history yxµ,π<t in environment µ is V
π
µ (yx
µ,π
<t ) :=
1
Γt
∑
∞
k=t γkr
µ,π
k . The optimal policy
π∗µ and its value V
∗
µ are defined π
∗
µ(yx<t) := argmaxπ V
π
µ (yx<t) and V
∗
µ (yx<t) :=
V
π∗µ
µ (yx<t).
Assumption 2 combined with Theorem 6 in [LH11] guarantees the existence
of π∗µ. Note that the normalisation term
1
Γt
does not change the policy, but is
used to ensure that values scale appropriately in the limit. For example, when
discounting geometrically we have, γt = γ
t for some γ ∈ (0, 1) and so Γt =
γt
1−γ
and
V πµ (yx
µ,π
<t ) = (1− γ)
∑
∞
k=t γ
k−trµ,πk .
Definition 7 (Asymptotic Optimality). LetM = {µ0, µ1, · · · } be a finite or count-
able set of environments and γ be a discount function. A policy π is a strong
asymptotically optimal policy in (M,γ) if
lim
n→∞
[
V ∗µ (yx
µ,π
<n)− V
π
µ (yx
µ,π
<n)
]
= 0, for all µ ∈M. (2)
It is a weak asymptotically optimal policy if
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
V ∗µ (yx
µ,π
<t )− V
π
µ (yx
µ,π
<t )
]
= 0, for all µ ∈M. (3)
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Strong asymptotic optimality demands that the value of a single policy π con-
verges to the value of the optimal policy π∗µ for all µ in the class. This means that
in the limit, a strong asymptotically optimal policy will obtain the maximum value
possible in that environments.
Weak asymptotic optimality is similar, but only requires the average value of the
policy π to converge to the average value of the optimal policy. This means that a
weak asymptotically optimal policy can still make infinitely many bad mistakes, but
must do so for only a fraction of the time that converges to zero. Strong asymptotic
optimality implies weak asymptotic optimality.
While the definition of strong asymptotic optimality is rather natural, the defini-
tion of weak asymptotic optimality appears somewhat more arbitrary. The purpose
of the average is to allow the agent to make a vanishing fraction of serious errors over
its (infinite) life-time. We believe this is a necessary condition for an agent to learn
the true environment. Of course, it would be possible to insist that the agent make
only o(log n) serious errors rather than o(n), which would make a stronger version
of weak asymptotic optimality. Our choice is the weakest notion of optimality of
the above form that still makes sense, which turns out to be already too strong for
some discount rates.
Note that for both versions of optimality an agent would be considered optimal if
it actively undertook a policy that led it to an extremely bad “hell” state from which
it could not escape. Since the state cannot be escaped, its policy would then coincide
with the optimal policy and so it would be considered optimal. Unfortunately, this
problem seems to be an unavoidable consequence of learning algorithms in non-
ergodic environments in general, including the currently fashionable PAC algorithms
for arbitrary finite Markov decision processes.
3 Non-Existence of Asymptotically Optimal Poli-
cies
We present the negative theorem in three parts. The first shows that, at least for
computable discount functions, there does not exist a strong asymptotically optimal
policy. The second shows that any weak asymptotically optimal policy must be
incomputable while the third shows that there exist discount functions for which
even incomputable weak asymptotically optimal policies do not exist.
Theorem 8. Let M be the class of all deterministic computable environments and
γ a computable discount function, then:
1. There does not exist a strong asymptotically optimal policy in (M,γ).
2. There does not exist a computable weak asymptotically optimal policy in
(M,γ).
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3. If γk :=
1
k(k+1)
then there does not exist a weak asymptotically optimal policy
in (M,γ).
Part 1 of Theorem 8 says there is no strong asymptotically optimal policy in
the class of all computable deterministic environments when the discount function
is computable. It is likely there exist non-computable discount functions for which
there are strong asymptotically optimal policies. Unfortunately the discount func-
tions for which this is true are likely to be somewhat pathological and not realistic.
Given that strong asymptotic optimality is too strong, we should search for weak
asymptotically optimal policies. Part 2 of Theorem 8 shows that any such policy is
necessarily incomputable. This result features no real new ideas and relies on the
fact that you can use a computable policy to hand-craft a computable environment
in which it does very badly [Leg06]. In general this approach fails for incomputable
policies because the hand-crafted environment will then not be computable. Note
that this does not rule out the existence of a stochastically computable weak asymp-
totically optimal policy.
It turns out that even weak asymptotic optimality is too strong for some discount
functions. Part 3 of Theorem 8 gives an example discount function for which no
such policy (computable or otherwise) exists. In the next section we introduce a
weak asymptotically optimal policy for geometric (and may be extended to other)
discounting. Note that γk =
1
k(k+1)
is an example of a discount function where
Ht(p) = Ω(t). It is also analytically easy to work with.
All negative results are proven by contradiction, and follow the same basic form.
1. Assume π is a computable/arbitrary weak/strong asymptotically optimal.
2. Therefore π is weak/strong asymptotically optimal in µ for some particular µ.
3. Construct ν, which is indistinguishable from µ under π, but where π is not
weak/strong asymptotically optimal in ν.
Proof of Theorem 8, Part 1. Let Y = {up, down} and O = ∅. Now assume some
policy π is a strong asymptotically optimal policy. Define an environment µ by,
µ(yr<tyt) =
{
1
2
if yt = up
0 if yt = down
∈ R
That is µ(yr<tyt) ∈ R is the reward given when taking action yt having previously
taken actions y<t. Note that we have omitted the observations as O = ∅. It is easy
to see that the optimal policy π∗µ(yr<t) = up for all yr<t with corresponding value
V ∗µ (yr<t) =
1
2
. Since π is strongly asymptotically optimal,
lim
n→∞
V πµ (yr
µ,π
1:n ) =
1
2
. (4)
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Assume there exists a time-sequence t1, t2, t3, · · · such that y
µ,π
t = down (and hence
rµ,πt = 0) for all t ∈
⋃
∞
i=1[ti, ti + Hti(
1
4
)]. Therefore by the definition of the value
function,
V πµ (yr
µ,π
ti
) ≤
1
Γti

1
2
∞∑
k=ti+Hti(
1
4
)+1
γk

 = 1
2

1− 1
Γti
ti+Hti(
1
4
)∑
k=ti
γk

 (5)
≤
1
2
[
1−
1
4
]
(6)
where (5) follows from the definitions of the value function and Γ, and the assump-
tion in the previous line. (6) follows by algebra and the definition of Hti(
1
4
). This
contradicts (4). Therefore for any strong asymptotically optimal policy π there ex-
ists a T ∈ N such that for all t ≥ T , yµ,πs = up for some s ∈ [t, t + Ht(
1
4
)]. I.e, π
cannot take sub-optimal action down too frequently. In particular, it cannot take
action down for large contiguous blocks of time. Construct a new environment ν
defined by
ν(yr<tyt) =


µ(yr<tyt) if t < T
1
2
if yt = up
1 if yt = down and exist t
′ ≥ T such that t′ +Ht′(
1
4
) ≤ t and
ys = down ∀s ∈ [t
′, t′ +Ht′(
1
4
)]
0 otherwise
Note that ν is computable ifHt(
1
4
) is and that by construction the play-out sequences
for µ and ν when using policy π are identical. We now consider the optimal policy
in ν. For any t ≥ T consider the value of policy π˜ defined by π˜(yr<t) := down for
all yr<t.
V π˜ν (yr<t) =
1
Γt

 ∞∑
k=t+Ht(
1
4
)
γk


≥
3
4
.
This is because π˜ spends Ht(
1
4
) − 1 time-steps playing down and receiving reward
0 before “unlocking” a reward of 1 on all subsequent plays. On the other hand,
V πν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≤
1
2
because π can never unlock the reward of 1 because it never plays
down for a contiguous block of Ht(
1
4
) time-steps. By the definition of the optimal
policy, V π˜ν (yr<t) ≤ V
∗
ν (yr<t). Therefore
V ∗ν (yr
ν,π
<t )− V
π
ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≥
1
4
.
8
Therefore
lim sup
t→∞
[V ∗ν (yr
ν,π
<t )− V
π
ν (yr
ν,π
<t )] ≥
1
4
6= 0.
Therefore there does not exist an asymptotically optimal policy π in (M,γ).
Proof of Theorem 8, Part 2. Let Y = {up, down} and O = ∅. Now let M be the
class of all computable deterministic environments and γ be an arbitrary discount
function. Suppose π is computable and consider the environment µ defined by
µ(yr<tyt) =
{
1 if yt 6= π(yr>t)
0 otherwise
Since π is computable µ is as well. Therefore µ ∈M. Now V ∗µ (yr<t) = 1 for all yr<t
while V πµ (yr<t) = 0. Therefore limn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1
∣∣V ∗µ (yr<t)− V πµ (yr<t)∣∣ = 1 and so π is
not weakly asymptotically optimal.
Proof of Theorem 8, Part 3. Recall γk =
1
k(k+1)
and so Γt =
1
t
. Now let Y =
{up, down} and O = ∅. Define µ by
µ(yr<tyt) =
{
1
2
if yt = up
1
2
− ǫ if yt = down
where ǫ ∈ (0, 1
2
) will be chosen later. As before, V ∗µ (yr<t) =
1
2
. Assume π is weakly
asymptotically optimal. Therefore
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
V πµ (yr
µ,π
<t ) =
1
2
. (7)
We show by contradiction that π cannot explore (take action down) too often.
Assume there exists an infinite time-sequence t1, t2, t3, · · · such that π(yr
µ,π
<t ) = down
for all t ∈
⋃
∞
i=1[ti, 2ti]. Then for t ∈ [ti,
3
2
ti] we have
V πµ (yr
µ,π
<t ) ≡
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkr
µ,π
k ≤ t
[
(
1
2
− ǫ)
2ti∑
k=t
γk +
1
2
∞∑
k=2ti+1
γk
]
(8)
=
1
2
− ǫ
[
1−
t
2ti + 1
]
<
1
2
−
ǫ
4
(9)
where (8) is the definition of the value function and the previous assumption and
definition of µ. (9) by algebra and since t ∈ [ti,
3
2
ti]. Therefore
1
2ti
2ti∑
t=1
V πµ (yr
µ,π
<t ) <
1
2ti

ti−1∑
t=1
1
2
+
3
2
ti−1∑
t=ti
(
1
2
−
ǫ
4
)
+
2ti∑
t= 3
2
ti
1
2

 = 1
2
−
1
16
ǫ. (10)
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The first inequality follows from (9) and because the maximum value of any play-out
sequence in µ is 1
2
. The second by algebra. Therefore lim infn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1 V
π
µ (yr
µ,π
<t ) <
1
2
− 1
16
ǫ < 1
2
, which contradicts (7). Therefore there does not exist a time-sequence
t1 < t2 < t3 < · · · such that π(yr
µ,π
<t ) = down for all t ∈
⋃
∞
i=1[ti, 2ti].
So far we have shown that π cannot “explore” for t consecutive time-steps start-
ing at time-step t, infinitely often. We now construct an environment similar to µ
where this is required. Choose T to be larger than the last time-step t at which
yµ,πs = down for all s ∈ [t, 2t] Define ν by
ν(yr<tyt) =


µ(yr<tyt) if t < T
1
2
if yt = down and there does not exist t
′ ≥ T
such that ys = down∀s ∈ [t
′, 2t′]
1 if yt = down and exists t
′ ≥ T such that 2t′ < t and
ys = down∀s ∈ [t
′, 2t′]
1
2
− ǫ otherwise
Now we compare the values in environment ν of π and π∗ν at times t ≥ T . Since π
does not take action down for t consecutive time-steps at any time after T , it never
“unlocks” the reward of 1 and so V πν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≤
1
2
. Now let π˜(yr<t) = down for all
yr<t. Therefore, for t ≥ 2T ,
V π˜ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≡
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
γkr
ν,π˜
k ≥ t
[(
1
2
− ǫ
) 2t−1∑
k=t
γk +
∞∑
k=2t
γk
]
(11)
= t
[(
1
2
− ǫ
)(
1
t
−
1
2t
)
+
1
2t
]
=
3
4
−
1
2
ǫ (12)
where (11) follows by the definition of ν and π˜. (12) by the definition of γk
and algebra. Finally, setting ǫ = 1
4
gives V π˜ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≥
5
8
= 1
2
+ 1
8
. Since
V ∗ν ≥ V
π˜
ν , we get V
∗
ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) − V
π
ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≥ V
π˜
ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) − V
π
ν (yr
ν,π
<t ) ≥
1
8
. Therefore
lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1 [V
∗(yrν,π<t )− V
π
ν (yr
ν,π
<t )] ≥
1
8
, and so π is not weakly asymptoti-
cally optimal.
We believe it should be possible to generalise the above to computable discount
functions with Ht(p) > cpt with cp > 0 for infinitely many t, but the proof will likely
be messy.
4 Existence of Weak Asymptotically Optimal
Policies
In the previous section we showed there did not exist a strong asymptotically optimal
policy (for most discount functions) and that any weak asymptotically optimal policy
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must be incomputable. In this section we show that a weak asymptotically optimal
policy exists for geometric discounting (and is, of course, incomputable).
The policy is reminiscant of ǫ-exploration in finite state MDPs (or UCB for
bandits) in that it spends most of its time exploiting the information it already
knows, while still exploring sufficiently often (and for sufficiently long) to detect any
significant errors in its model.
The idea will be to use a model-based policy that chooses its current model to be
the first environment in the model class (all computable deterministic environments)
consistent with the history seen so far. With increasing probability it takes the best
action according to this policy, while still occasionally exploring randomly. When it
explores it always does so in bursts of increasing length.
Definition 9 (History Consistent). A deterministic environment µ is consistent
with history yx<t if µ(yx<kyk) = xk, for all k < t.
Definition 10 (Weak Asymptotically Optimal Policy). Let Y = {0, 1} and M =
{µ1, µ2, µ3, · · · } be a countable class of deterministic environments. Define a prob-
ability measure P on B∞ inductively by, P (zn = 1|z<n) :=
1
n
, for all z<n ∈ B
n−1.
Now let χ ∈ B∞ be sampled from P and define χ¯, χ˙h ∈ B∞ by
χ¯k :=
{
1 if k ∈
⋃
i:χi=1
[i, i+ log i]
0 otherwise
χ˙hk :=
{
0 if χ¯k:k+h = 0
h+1
1 otherwise
Next let ψ be sampled from the uniform measure (each bit of ψ is independently
sampled from a Bernoulli 1/2 distribution) and define a policy π by,
π(yx<t) :=
{
π∗νt(yx
π,µ
<t ) if χ¯t = 0
ψt otherwise
(13)
where νt = µit with it = min {i : µi consistent with history yx
π,µ
<t } < ∞. Note that
it is always finite because there exists an i such that µi = µ, in which case µi is
necessarily consistent with yxπ,µ<t .
Intuitively, χk = 1 at time-steps when the agent will explore for log k time-steps.
χ¯k = 1 if the agent is exploring at time k and ψk is the action taken if exploring at
time-step k. χ˙ will be used later, with χ˙hk = 1 if the agent will explore at least once
in the interval [k, k + h]. If the agent is not exploring then it acts according to the
optimal policy for the first consistent environment in M.
Theorem 11. Let γt = γ
t with γ ∈ (0, 1) (geometric discounting) then the policy
defined in Definition 10 is weakly asymptotically optimal in the class of all deter-
ministic computable environments with probability 1.
Some remarks:
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1. That Y = {0, 1} is only convenience, rather than necessity. The policy is easily
generalised to arbitrary finite Y .
2. π is essentially a stochastic policy. With some technical difficulties it is possible
to construct an equivalent deterministic policy. This is done by choosing χ
to be any P -Martin-Lo¨f random sequence and ψ to be a sequence that is
Martin-Lo¨f random w.r.t to the uniform measure. The theorem then holds for
all deterministic environments. The proof is somewhat delicate and may not
extend nicely to stochastic environments. For an introduction to Kolmogorov
complexity and Martin-Lo¨f randomness, see [LV08]. For a reason why the
stochastic case may not go through as easily, see [HM07].
3. The policy defined in Definition 10 is not computable for two reasons. First,
because it relies on the stochastic sequences χ and ψ. Second, because the
operation of finding the first environment consistent with the history is not
computable.2 We do not know if there exists a weak asymptotically optimal
policy that is computable when given access to a random number generator
(or if it is given χ and ψ).
4. The bursts of exploration are required for optimality. Without them it will be
possible to construct counter-example environments similar to those used in
part 3 of Theorem 8.
Before the proof we require some more definitions and lemmas. Easier proofs are
omitted.
Definition 12 (h-Difference). Let µ and ν be two environments consistent with
history yx<t, then µ is h-different to ν if there exists yxt:t+h satisfying
yk = π
∗
µ(yx<k) for all k ∈ [t, t+ h],
xk = µ(yx<kyk) for all k ∈ [t, t+ h],
xk 6= ν(yx<kyk) for some k ∈ [t, t+ h].
Intuitively, µ is h-different to ν at history yx<t if playing the optimal policy for
µ for h time-steps makes ν inconsistent with the new history. Note that h-difference
is not symmetric.
Lemma 13. If an ∈ [0, 1] and lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1 an = ǫ and α ∈ B
∞ is an indicator
sequence with αi := [[ai ≥ ǫ/4]],
3 then
∏
∞
i=1
[
1− αi
i
]
= 0.
See the appendix for the proof.
Lemma 14. Let a1, a2, a3, · · · be a sequence with an ∈ [0, 1] for all n. The following
properties of χ are true with probability 1.
2The class of computable environments is not recursively enumerable [LV08].
3[[expression]] = 1 if expression is true and 0 otherwise.
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1. For any h, lim supn→∞
1
n
#1(χ˙h1:n) = 0.
2. If lim sup 1
n
∑n
i=1 ai = ǫ > 0 and αi := [[ai > ǫ/2]] then αi = χi = 1 for
infinitely many i.
Proof. 1. Let i ∈ N, ǫ > 0 and Eǫi be the event that #1(χ˙
h
1:2i) > 2
iǫ. Using the
definition of χ˙h to compute the expectation E
[
#1(χ˙h1:2i)
]
< i(i+ 1)h and applying
the Markov inequality gives that P (Eǫi ) < i(i+ 1)h2
−i/ǫ. Therefore
∑
i∈N P (E
ǫ
i ) <
∞. Therefore the Borel-Cantelli lemma gives that Eǫi occurs for only finitely many i
with probability 1. We now assume that lim supn→∞
1
n
#1(χ˙h1:n) > 2ǫ > 0 and show
that Eǫi must occur infinitely often. By the definition of lim sup and our assumption
we have that there exists a sequence n1, n2, · · · such that #1(χ˙
h
1:ni
) > 2niǫ for all
i ∈ N. Let n+ := mink∈N
{
2k : 2k ≥ n
}
and note that #1(χ˙h
1:n+i
) > n+i ǫ, which is
exactly Eǫ
logn+
i
. Therefore there exist infinitely many i such that Eǫi occurs and so
lim supn→∞
1
n
#1(χ˙h1:n) = 0 with probability 1.
2. The probability that αi = 1 =⇒ χi = 0 for all i ≥ T is P (αi = 1 =⇒ χi =
0∀i ≥ T ) =
∏
∞
i=T
(
1− αi
i
)
=: p = 0, by Lemma 13. Therefore the probability that
αi = χi = 1 for only finitely many i is zero. Therefore there exists infinitely many i
with αi = χi = 1 with probability 1, as required.
Lemma 15 (Approximation Lemma). Let π1 and π2 be policies, µ an environ-
ment and h ≥ Ht(1 − ǫ). Let yx<t be an arbitrary history and yx
µ,πi
t:t+h be the future
action/observation/reward triples when playing policy πi. If yx
π1,µ
t:t+h = yx
π2,µ
t:t+h then
|V π1µ (yx<t)− V
π2
µ (yx<t)| < ǫ.
Proof. By the definition of the value function,
|V π1µ (yx<t)− V
π2
µ (yx<t)| ≤
1
Γt
∞∑
i=t
γi |r
π1,µ
i − r
π2,µ
i | (14)
=
1
Γt
∞∑
i=t+h+1
γi |r
π1,µ
i − r
π2,µ
i | ≤
1
Γt
∞∑
i=t+h+1
γi < ǫ (15)
(14) follows from the definition of the value function. (15) since rπ1,µi = r
π2,µ
i for
i ∈ [t, t + h], rewards are bounded in [0, 1] and by the definition of h := Ht(1 − ǫ)
(Definition 5).
Recall that π∗µ and π
∗
ν are the optimal policies in environments µ and ν respec-
tively (see Definition 6).
Lemma 16 (h-difference). If |V
π∗µ
µ (yx
π,µ
<t ) − V
π∗ν
µ (yx
π,µ
<t )| > ǫ then µ is Ht(1 − ǫ)-
different to ν on yxπ,µ.
Proof. Follows from the approximation lemma.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 11. Let π be the policy defined in Definition 10 and µ
be the true (unknown) environment. Recall that νt = µit with it =
min {i : µi consistent with history yx
π,µ
<t } is the first model consistent with the his-
tory yxπ,µ<t at time t and is used by π when not exploring. First we claim there exists
a T ∈ N and environment ν such that νt = ν for all t ≥ T . Two facts,
1. If µi is inconsistent with history yx
π,µ
<t then it is also inconsistent with yx
π,µ
<t+h
for all h ∈ N.
2. µ is consistent with yxπ,µ<t for all π, t.
By 1) we have that the sequence i1, i2, i3, · · · is monotone increasing. By 2) we have
that the sequence is bounded by i with µi = µ. The claim follows since any bounded
monotone sequence of natural numbers converges in finite time. Let ν := ν∞ be the
environment to which ν1, ν2, ν3, · · · converges to. Note that ν must be consistent
with history yxµ,π<t for all t. We now show by contradiction that the optimal policy
for ν is weakly asymptotically optimal in environment µ. Suppose it were not, then
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
V ∗µ (yx
π,µ
<t )− V
π∗ν
µ (yx
π,µ
<t )
]
= ǫ > 0. (16)
Let α ∈ B∞ be defined by αt := 1 if and only if,[
V ∗µ (yx
π,µ
<t )− V
π
µ (yx
π,µ
<t )
]
≥ ǫ/4. (17)
By Lemma 14 there exists (with probability one) an infinite sequence t1, t2, t3, · · ·
for which χk = αk = 1. Intuitively we should view time-step tk as the start
of an “exploration” phase where the agent explores for log tk time-steps. Let
h := Htk(1 − ǫ/4) = ⌈log(ǫ/4)/ log γ⌉, which importantly is independent of tk (for
geometric discounting). Since log tk → ∞ we will assume that log tk ≥ h for all
tk. Therefore χ¯i = 1 for all i ∈
⋃
∞
k=1[tk, tk + h]. Therefore by the definition of
π, π(yxπ,µ<i ) = ψi for i ∈
⋃
∞
k=1[tk, tk + h]. By Lemma 16 and Equation (17), µ is
h-different to ν on history yxπ,µ<tk . This means that if there exists a k such that π
plays according to the optimal policy for µ on all time-steps t ∈ [tk, tk + h] then
ν will be inconsistent with the history yxµ,π1:tk+h, which is a contradiction. We now
show that π does indeed play according to the optimal policy for µ for all time-
steps t ∈ [tk, tk + h] for at least one k. Formally, we show the following holds with
probability 1 for some k.
ψi ≡ π(yx
π,µ
<i ) = π
∗
µ(yx
π,µ
<i ), for all i ∈ [tk, tk + h]. (18)
Recall that ψ ∈ B∞ where ψi ∈ B is identically independently distributed according
to a Bernoulli(1
2
) distribution. Therefore P (ψi = π
∗
µ(yx
π,µ
<i )) =
1
2
. Therefore p :=
P (ψi = π
∗
µ(yx
π,µ
<i )∀i ∈ [tk, tk + h]) =
∏tk+h
i=tk
P (ψi = π
∗
µ(yx
π,µ
<i )) = 2
−h−1 > 0 and
P (∀k∃i ∈ [tk, tk + h] with ψi 6= π
∗
µ(yx
π,µ
<i )) =
∏
∞
k=1(1 − p) = 0. Therefore Equation
14
(18) is satisfied for some k with probability 1 and so Equation (16) leads to a
contradiction. Therefore
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
V ∗µ (yx
π,µ
<t )− V
π∗ν
µ (yx
π,µ
<t )
]
= 0. (19)
We have shown that the optimal policy for ν has similar µ-values to the optimal
policy for µ. We now show that π acts according to π∗ν sufficiently often that it too
has values close to those of the optimum policy for the true environment, µ. Let
ǫ > 0, h := Ht(1 − ǫ) and t ≥ T . If χ˙
h
t = 0 then by the definition of π and the
approximation lemma we obtain∣∣V π∗νµ (yxπ,µ<t )− V πµ (yxπ,µ<t )∣∣ < ǫ. (20)
Therefore
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
∣∣V π∗νµ (yxπ,µ<t )− V πµ (yxπ,µ<t )∣∣ ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣
T−1∑
t=1
1 +
n∑
t=T
[
χ˙ht (1− ǫ) + ǫ
]∣∣∣∣∣
(21)
= ǫ+ (1− ǫ) lim sup
n→∞
1
n
#1(χ˙hT :n) (22)
= ǫ (23)
where (21) follows since values are bounded in [0, 1] and Equation (20). (22) follows
by algebra. (23) by part 1 of Lemma 14. By sending ǫ→ 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
V π
∗
ν
µ (yx
π,µ
<t )− V
π
µ (yx
π,µ
<t )
]
= 0. (24)
Finally, combining Equations (19) and (24) gives the result.
We expect this theorem to generalise without great difficulty to discount func-
tions satisfying Ht(p) < cp log(t) for all p. There will be two key changes. First,
extend the exploration time to some function E(t) with E(t) ∈ O(Hp(t)) for all
p. Second, modify the probability of exploration to ensure that Lemma 14 remains
true.
5 Discussion
Summary. Part 1 of Theorem 8 shows that no policy can be strongly asymptoti-
cally optimal for any computable discount function. The key insight is that strong
asymptotic optimality essentially implies exploration must eventually cease. Once
this occurs, the environment can change without the agent discovering the difference
and the policy will no longer be optimal.
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A weaker notion of asymptotic optimality, that a policy be optimal on average
in the limit, turns out to be more interesting. Part 2 of Theorem 8 shows that no
weak asymptotically optimal policy can be computable. We should not be surprised
by this result. Any computable policy can be used to construct a computable en-
vironment in which that policy does very badly. Note that by computable here we
mean deterministic and computable. There may be computable stochastic policies
that are weakly asymptotically optimal, but we feel this is unlikely.
Part 3 of Theorem 8, shows that even weak asymptotically optimal policies need
not exist if the discount function is sufficiently far-sighted. On the other hand,
Theorem 11 shows that weak asymptotically optimal policies do exist for some dis-
count rates, in particular, for the default geometric discounting. These non-trivial
and slightly surprising result shows that choice of discount function is crucial to the
existence of weak asymptotically optimal policies. Where weak asymptotically opti-
mal policies do exist, they must explore infinitely often and in increasing contiguous
bursts of exploration where the length of each burst is dependent on the discount
function.
Consequences. It would appear that Theorem 8 is problematic for artificial general
intelligence. We cannot construct incomputable policies, and so we cannot construct
weak asymptotically optimal policies. However, this is not as problematic as it may
seem. There are a number of reasonable counter arguments:
1. We may be able to make stochastically computable policies that are asymp-
totically optimal. If the existence of true random noise is assumed then this
would be a good solution.
2. The counter-example environment constructed in part 2 of Theorem 8 is a sin-
gle environment roughly as complex as the policy itself. Certainly, if the world
were adversarial this would be a problem, but in general this appears not to
be the case. On the other hand, if the environment is a learning agent itself,
this could result in a complexity arms race without bound. There may ex-
ist a computable weak asymptotically optimal policy in some extremely large
class of environments. For example, the algorithm of Section 4 is stochasti-
cally computable when the class of environments is recursively enumerable and
contains only computable environments. A natural (and already quite large)
class satisfying these properties is finite-state Markov decision processes with
{0, 1}-valued transition functions and rational-valued rewards.
3. While it is mathematically pleasant to use asymptotic behaviour to charac-
terise optimal general intelligent behaviour, in practise we usually care about
more immediate behaviour. We expect that results, and even (parameter free)
formal definitions of intelligence satisfying this need will be challenging, but
worthwhile.
4. Accept that even weak asymptotic optimality is too strong and find something
weaker, but still useful.
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Relation to AIXI. The policy defined in Section 4 is not equivalent to AIXI
[Hut04], which is also incomputable. However, if the computable environments in
M are ordered by complexity then it is likely the two will be quite similar. The
key difference is the policy defined in this paper will continue to explore whereas it
was shown in [Ors10] that AIXI eventually ceases exploration in some environments
and some histories. We believe, and a proof should not be too hard, that AIXI
will become weakly asymptotically optimal if an exploration component is added
similarly as in Section 4.
We now briefly compare the self-optimising property in [Hut02] to strong
asymptotic optimality. A policy π is self-optimising in a class M if
limt→∞
[
V ∗µ (yx<t)− V
π
µ (yx<t)
]
= 0 for any infinite history yx1:∞ and for all µ ∈ M.
This is similar to strong asymptotic optimality, but convergence must be on all histo-
ries, rather than the histories actually generated by π. This makes the self-optimising
property a substantially stronger form of optimality than strong asymptotic opti-
mality. It has been proven that if there exists self-optimising policy for a particular
class, then AIXI is also self-optimising in that class [Hut02].
It is possible to define a weak version of the self-optimising property by insisting
that limn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1
[
V ∗µ (yx<t)− V
π
µ (yx<t)
]
= 0 for all yx1:∞ and all µ ∈ M. It can
then be proven that the existence of a weak self-optimising policy would imply that
AIXI were also weakly self-optimising. However, the policy defined in Section 4
cannot be modified to have the weak self-optimising property. It must be allowed
to choose its actions itself. This is consistent with the work in [Ors10] which shows
that AIXI cannot be weakly asymptotically optimal, and so cannot be weak self-
optimising either.
Discounting. Throughout this paper we have assumed rewards to be discounted ac-
cording to a summable discount function. A very natural alternative to discounting,
suggested in [LH07], is to restrict interest to environments satisfying
∑
∞
k=1 r
µ,π
k ≤ 1.
Now the goal of the agent is simply to maximise summed rewards. In this setting
it is easy to see that the positive theorem is lost while all negative ones still hold!
This is unfortunate, as discounting presents a major philosophical challenge. How
to choose a discount function?
Assumptions/Limitations. Assumption 2 ensures that Y and O are finite. All
negative results go through for countable Y and O. The optimal policy of Section
4 may not generalise to countable Y . We have also assumed bounded reward and
discrete time. The first seems reasonable while the second allows for substantially
easier analysis. Additionally we have only considered deterministic computable en-
vironments. The stochastic case is unquestionably interesting. We invoked Church
thesis to assert that computable stochastic environments are essentially the largest
class of interesting environments.
Many of our Theorems are only applicable to computable discount functions.
All well-known discount function in use today are computable. However [Hut04]
has suggested γt = 2
−K(t), where K(t) is the (incomputable) prefix Kolmogorov
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complexity of t, may have nice theoretical properties.
Open Questions. A number of open questions have arisen during this research.
In particular,
1. Prove Theorem 8 for a larger class of discount functions.
2. Prove or disprove the existence of a weak asymptotically optimal stochastically
computable policy for some discount function in the class of deterministic
computable environments.
3. Modify the policy of Section 4 to the larger class of stochastically computable
environments. We believe this to be possible along the lines of [RH08], but
inevitably the analysis will be messy and complex.
4. Extend Part 3 of Theorem 8 and Theorem 11 to a complete classification of dis-
count functions according to whether or not they admit a weak asymptotically
optimal policy in the class of computable environments.
5. Prove that AIXI is weakly asymptotically optimal when augmented with an
exploration component as in Section 4.
6. Define and study other formal measures of optimality/intelligence.
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A Technical Proofs
Lemma 17. Let A = {a1, a2, · · · , an} with a ∈ [0, 1] for all a ∈ A. If
1
n
∑
a∈A a ≥ ǫ
then ∣∣∣{a ∈ A : a ≥ ǫ
2
}∣∣∣ > nǫ
2
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Proof. Let A> :=
{
a ∈ A : a ≥ ǫ
2
}
and A< := A−A>. Therefore
nǫ ≤
∑
a∈A
a =
∑
a∈A<
a +
∑
a∈A>
a
≤
∑
a∈A<
ǫ
2
+
∑
a∈A>
1
= |A<|
ǫ
2
+ |A>|
By rearranging and algebra,
∣∣{a ∈ A : a ≥ ǫ
2
}∣∣ ≡ |A>| > n ǫ2 as required.
Proof of Lemma 13. First,
∞∏
i=1
[
1−
αi
i
]
≤ exp
[
−
∞∑
i=1
αi
i
]
(25)
Equation (25) follows since 1− a ≤ exp(−a) for all a.
Now since lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n
i=1 an = ǫ, we have for any N there exists an
n > N such that 1
n
∑n
i=1 an >
ǫ
2
. Let n1 = 0 then inductively choose ni =
min
{
n : n > 8(ni−1+1)
ǫ
∧ 1
n
∑n
i=1 ai >
ǫ
2
}
By Lemma 17, ∣∣∣{i ≤ nj : ai ≥ ǫ
4
}∣∣∣ ≥ nj ǫ
4
(26)
Therefore
nj+1∑
i=nj+1
αi
i
≥
nj+1∑
i=nj+1−
ǫ
4
nj+1+nj+1
1
nj+1
(27)
≥
nj+1∑
i=(1− ǫ
8
)nj+1
1
nj+1
=
ǫ
8
(28)
Equation (27) follows from (26) and because 1
i
is a decreasing function. (28) follows
from the definition of nj and algebra. Therefore
∞∑
i=1
αi
i
= lim
k→∞
k∑
j=1
nj+1∑
i=nj+1
αi
i
≥ lim
k→∞
k∑
j=1
ǫ
8
=∞ (29)
Finally, substituting Equation (29) into (25) gives,
∞∏
i=1
[
1−
αi
i
]
= 0
as required.
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B Table of Notation
Symbol Description
Y Set of possible actions
O Set of possible observations
R Set of possible rewards
µ, ν Environments
y An action.
x An observation/reward pair
r A reward
o An observation
[[expr]] The delta function. [[expression]] = 1 if expression is true and 0
otherwise.
¬b The not function. ¬0 = 1 and ¬1 = 0.
π A policy.
χ An infinite binary string. χk = 1 if an agent starts exploring at time-
step k.
χ¯ An infinite binary string. χ¯k = 1 if an agent is exploring at time-step
k.
χ˙h An infinite binary string. χ˙hk = 0 if an agent will not explore for the
next h time-steps.
α An infinite binary string.
ψ An infinite random binary string sampled from the coin flip measure.
t, n, i, j, k Time indices.
yx<t A sequence of action/observation/reward sequences. Splits into
y1o1r1y2o2r2 · · · yt−1ot−1rt−1.
yxµ,π<t The sequence of action/reward/observations seen in deterministic en-
vironment µ when playing policy π.
V πµ (yx<t) The value of playing policy π in environment µ starting at history
yx<t.
V ∗µ (yx<t) The value of playing the optimum policy π in environment µ starting
at history yx<t.
π∗µ The optimum policy in environment µ.
Ht(p) The p-percentile horizon.
0h+1 A binary string consisting of h + 1 zeros.
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